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Chapter 11
The measurement problem
The measurement problem of quantum mechanics was probably born in 1926:
‘Thus Schro¨dinger’s quantum mechanics gives a very deﬁnite answer to the question of the
outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal relationship. One obtains
no answer to the question “what is the state after the collision,” but only to the question
“how probable is a speciﬁc outcome of the collision” (in which the quantum-mechanical
law of [conservation of] energy must of course be satisﬁed). This raises the entire problem
of determinism. From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that
could causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however, so far
we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are internal properties of
atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should we hope to discover such properties
that determine individual outcomes later (perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)?
Or should we believe that the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our in-
ability to give conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that
is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish determinism in
the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question, for which physical arguments
alone are not decisive.’ (Born, 1926a, p. 866; translation by the author)
In other words, quantum mechanics stipulates that the state after some collision (or
measurement) is ψ = ∑n cnψn, whereas experiment demonstrates that in fact the ﬁ-
nal state is just one of the ψn, with (Born) probability |cn|2. Quantum mechanics,
then, seems unable to account for single outcomes of experiments and has to satisfy
physicists with merely probabilistic predictions. This, in a nutshell, is the measure-
ment problem—although very substantial analysis is needed to ﬂesh it out.
Giving up determinism was soon incorporated in the Copenhagen Interpretation
of Bohr and Heisenberg (cf. the Introduction) and more broadly became part of
what might be called “orthodoxy”, which represents the apparent (but not actual)
consensus among Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Born, Jordan, Dirac, von Neumann, and
many others, which they supposedly reached around 1930 after the formal com-
pletion of quantum mechanics. This “orthodoxy”, which later gave rise to the un-
fortunate “shut up and calculate” attitude most physicists seem to have (especially
towards the measurement problem), should be distinguished from the Copenhagen
Interpretation. For example, von Neumann never endorsed the doctrine of classical
concepts, which in the above attitude has been replaced by the different and far more
superﬁcial idea that it is the entire goal of physics to explain experiments.
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11.1 The rise of orthodoxy
Even within the strict Copenhagen Interpretation, there were sharp differences be-
tween Bohr and Heisenberg, beyond the one concerning classical concepts reviewed
in the Introduction. However, it seems that they agreed about the following point
made by Bohr in his Como lecture concerning measurement:
‘According to the quantum theory, just the impossibility of neglecting the interaction with
the agency of measurement means that every observation introduces a new uncontrollable
element.’ (Bohr, 1928, p. 584)
This placed measurement squarely outside quantum mechanics for the second time:
the ﬁrst time was in the insistence that the measurement device (“if it is to serve
its purpose”) had to be described classically (cf. the Introduction), and now we also
learn that the interaction between the quantum object undergoing measurement and
the apparatus in question is “uncontrollable”, despite the fact that Bohr and Heisen-
berg regarded quantum mechanics as a complete theory: their argument was ap-
parently that precisely the classical nature of the apparatus makes the interaction
uncontrollable. This in turn justiﬁed the classical description of the device, in that
registration of a measurement result ought to be “objective”, so that reading it out
by performing a measurement on the apparatus, so to speak, should not introduce
any further disturbance and hence uncontrollability (or so the argument goes).
Consistent with Bohr’s point, a more detailed conceptual analysis of the measure-
ment process was given by Heisenberg (1958, pp. 46–47, 54–55), who consistently
refers to the quantum state or wave-function as the “probability function”:
‘Therefore, the theoretical interpretation of an experiment requires three distinct steps:
1. the translation of the initial experimental situation into a probability function;
2. the following up of this function in the course of time;
3. the statement of a new measurement to be made of the system, the result of which can
then be calculated from the probability function.
(. . . ) After [the] interaction [with the measuring device] has taken place, the probability
function contains the objective element of tendency and the subjective element of incom-
plete knowledge, even if it has been a “pure case” before [i.e., it has become a mixture].
It is for this reason that the result of the observation cannot generally be predicted with
certainty; what can be predicted is the probability of a certain result of the observation,
and this statement about the probability can be checked by repeating the experiment many
times. (. . . ) The observation itself [i.e., the act of registration of the result by the mind of the
observer] changes the probability function discontinuously; it selects of all possible events
the actual one that has taken place. Since through the observation our knowledge of the sys-
tem has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone the
discontinuous change and we speak of a “quantum jump.”
Here we ﬁnd the typical Copenhagen view of measurement as a two-step process:
1. Measurement turns an initial pure state (of the measured object) into a mixture;
2. One term in this mixture is singled out (by Nature and thence by the observer).
Note that Heisenberg’s last comment puts him squarely into the camp of what is
now called “QBism” (i.e., Quantum Bayesianism, see §11.2 below)!
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Von Neumann (1932, §VI.1) gave a more formal (and highly inﬂuential) presen-
tation of the (alleged) two stages of the measurement process:
‘In the discussion so far we have treated the relation of quantum mechanics to the various
causal and statistical methods of describing nature. In the course of this we found a pe-
culiar dual nature of the quantum mechanical procedure which could not be satisfactorily
explained. Namely, we found that on the one hand a state φ is transformed into the state φ ′
under the action of an energy operator H in the time interval 0≤ τ ≤ t:
∂
∂τ
φτ =−2πih Hφτ : 0≤ τ ≤ t
so if we write φ0 = φ , φt = φ ′ then φ ′ = e−
2πi
h tHφ , which is purely causal. A mixture U is
correspondingly transformed into
U′ = e−
2πi
h tHUe+
2πi
h tH
Therefore, as a consequence of the causal change of φ into φ ′ the [pure] states U = P[φ ]
[=|φ〉〈φ |] go over into the [pure] states U′ = P[φ ′] (process 2 in V.1.). On the other hand,
the state φ—which may measure a quantity with discrete spectrum, distinct eigenvalues and
eigenfunctions φ1, φ2, . . .—undergoes in a measurement a non-causal change in which each
of the states φ1, φ2, . . . can result, and in fact does result with the respective probabilities
|〈φ ,φ1〉|2, |〈φ ,φ2〉|2, . . . . That is, the mixture
U′ =
∞
∑
n=1
|〈φ ,φn〉|2P[φ ′]
obtains (. . . ) (process 1 in V.1.). Since the [pure] states [i.e. P[φ ]] go over into mixtures,
the process is not causal. The difference between these two processes U → U′ is a very
fundamental one: aside from their different behaviors in regard to the principle of causality,
they are also different in that the former is (thermodynamically) reversible, while the latter
is not.’ (pp. 417–418 in von Neumann (1955); translation: R.T. Beyer)
All this concerns merely the ﬁrst stage of the measurement, in which a pure state
is transformed into a mixed one. The second stage, in which a single outcome is
obtained, is already alluded to above (though clouded by von Neumann’s ensemble
language), but is described (in prose) later on through what is now called a von Neu-
mann chain: one redeﬁnes system plus apparatus as the system, and couples it to a
new apparatus, etc. This chain supposedly ends with the “ego” of the “individual”
whose “intellectual inner life” is ﬁnally responsible for a single outcome.
It is very remarkable that von Neumann nowhere seems to use the central Copen-
hagen dogma that the apparatus be described classically (cf. the Introduction), espe-
cially since the mathematics of operator algebras he was inventing at almost exactly
the same time is tailor-made for incorporating this dogma (which fact indeed forms
the motivation for the present book). One clue for his lack of enthusiasm may come
from the very end of his book (i.e., §VI.3), where he challenges ‘an explanation
often proposed to account for the statistical character of the process 1’, namely the
idea that (the non-unitary) process 1 might have its origin in an initial mixed state of
the apparatus. Indeed, even if the apparatus as a quantum-mechanical system is in a
pure state (as any system should be ontologically), its description as a classical sys-
tem generally renders its state mixed—and the same conclusion may be drawn on
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epistemic grounds, arguing that the state of macroscopic or otherwise complicated
systems cannot be known exactly. Many writings by the Copenhagen school, then,
suggest that the alleged unanalyzable nature of the measurement and the random-
ness of its outcome should be attributed to the classical description of the apparatus
and its ensuing mixed state, including our earlier quotation (cf. §8.4) from Heisen-
berg (1958) on the origin of probabilities in quantum mechanics:
‘these uncertainties (. . . ) are simply a consequence of the fact that we describe the experi-
ment in terms of classical physics’ (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 53)
To counter this argument, von Neumann argues that physics requires the (Born)
probabilities for the various outcomes to depend only on the initial state φ of the
quantum system undergoing measurement (as opposed to the state of the apparatus,
be it classical or quantum), whereas any “process 2” (i.e. unitary) time evolution
would merely push the coefﬁcients wn in the (alleged) mixed apparatus state into the
role of probabilities for the possible outcomes. However, ‘the wn are characteristic
of the observer alone (and therefore independent of φ )’, and hence
‘the non-causal nature of the process 1. is not produced by any incomplete knowledge of
the state of the observer.’ (von Neumann, 1955, p. 439).
Von Neumann’s argument became the mother of all “insolubility theorems” for the
measurement problem, some of which will be reviewed in §11.3 below.
Pauli (1933, §9) also includes some comments on measurement and the interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics in general. These display a bizarre hybrid between the
ideas of Bohr and von Neumann, somehow mediated by Heisenberg. Thus Pauli en-
dorses (even starts with) some notion of Complementarity, but he relates this to the
mathematical formalism rather than to the doctrine of classical concepts (which he
nowhere invokes). Similarly, his treatment of measurement on the one hand follows
the disturbance ideology of Bohr and Heisenberg (but without grounding this in the
classical description of the apparatus), whilst technically he quotes and follows von
Neumann, claiming that measurement leads to mixtures which subsequently reduce
to one term through ‘ein besonderer, naturgesetzlich nicht im Voraus determinierter
Akt’ (i.e., special process that does not follow deterministic laws of nature). A rather
more systematic review of early measurement theory was written by London &
Bauer (1939), whose opening is highly promising and almost poetic:
‘The majority of introductions to quantum mechanics follow a rather dogmatic path from
the moment that they reach the statistical interpretation of the theory. In general they are
content to show, by more or less intuitive considerations, how the actual measuring devices
always introduce an element of indeterminism, as this interpretation demands. However,
care is rarely taken to verify explicitly that the formalism of the theory, applied to that
special process which constitutes the measurement, truly implies a transition of the system
under study to a state of affairs less fully determined than before. A certain uneasiness
arises. One does not see exactly with what right and up to what point one may, in spite of
this loss of determinism, attribute to the system an appropriate state of its own. Physicists
are to some extent sleepwalkers, who try to avoid such issues and try to concentrate on
concrete problems. But it is exactly these questions of principle which nevertheless interest
nonphysicists and all who wish to understand what modern physics says about the analysis
of the act of observation itself.’ (London & Bauer, 1939, pp. 218-219)
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Yet the authors mainly repeat von Neumann’s analysis (conﬁrming its lofty status):
‘The interaction with the apparatus does not put the object into a new pure state. Alone,
it does not confer to the object a new wave function. On the contrary, it actually gives
nothing but a statistical mixture: It leads to one mixture for the object and one mixture for
the apparatus. For either system regarded individually there results uncertainty, incomplete
knowledge. Yet nothing prevents our reducing this uncertainty by further observation.
And this is our opportunity. So far we have only coupled one apparatus with one object.
But a coupling even with a measuring device is not yet a measurement. A measurement is
achieved only when the position of the pointer has been observed. It is precisely the increase
of knowledge, acquired by the observation, that gives the observer the right to choose among
the different components of the mixture predicted by the theory, to reject those which are not
observed, and to attribute thenceforth to the object a new wave function, that of the pure case
which he has found. We note the essential role played by the consciousness of the observer
in this transition from the mixture to the pure state. Without his effective intervention, one
would never obtain a new ψ function.’ (ibid., p. 251)
Accordingly, at the end of the golden era of quantum mechanics, the view of mea-
surement as a two-stage process in which a pure state is ﬁrst transformed into a mix-
ture in a more or less scientiﬁc way, upon which unanalyzable and possibly mental
phenomena bring about a single outcome, was ﬁrmly established, although—the
point deserves to be repeated—in their formal treatments neither von Neumann nor
London & Bauer incorporated the key claim Bohr and Heisenberg made about mea-
surement, namely that the corresponding apparatus must be described classically.
Opponents of the Copenhagen Interpretation (the most prominent among whom
were Einstein and Schro¨dinger) were well aware of this tension between formalism
and ideology, which in the form of Schro¨dinger’s Cat even reached immortality (!):
‘One may also construct highly burlesque cases. A cat is conﬁned in a box of steel together
with the following hellish machine (which one should secure against a direct attack by the
cat): A Geiger counter contains a tiny amount of radioactive material, so little that during
one hour possibly one of its atoms decays, but equally likely also none does; if it does, then
the counter is triggered and activates, via a relais, a little hammer which breaks a small
container of hydrocyanic acid. Having left this system to itself for one hour, one will say
that the cat is still alive if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The ﬁrst decay of an atom
would have poisoned her. The ψ-function of the entire system would express this in such
a way that in it the living and the dead cat would be mixed or spread out on equal terms.
What is typical about these cases is that an uncertainty which is originally limited to the
atomic domain has been transformed into a coarse-grained uncertainty, which may then
be decided by direct observation. This prevents us from regarding a “faded model” as an
image of reality in such a naive way. As such [this model] contains nothing that is unclear
or contradictory. There is a difference between a moved or poorly focused photograph and
a record of clouds and fog banks.’ (Schro¨dinger, 1935, p. 812; translation by the author)
The last sentence is particularly powerful, contrasting Schro¨dinger’s (as well as Ein-
stein’s) view that physics should describe some sharply deﬁned reality (of which
quantum mechanics at best produces blurred pictures) with the Copenhagen view,
according to which reality itself lacks focus (with quantum mechanics providing the
best possible picture of it). This contrast conﬁrms our idea that Schro¨dinger’s Cat
metaphor speciﬁcally draws attention to the problems that arise from the Copen-
hagen “duality postulate” that macroscopic systems (such as measurement devices
and cats) admit both a classical and a quantum-mechanical description.
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11.2 The rise of modernity: Swiss approach and Decoherence
Despite Schro¨dinger’s Cat, the measurement problem was not an active ﬁeld of re-
search until Wigner (1963) rekindled interest in the topic. Even so, his paper mainly
reiterated von Neumann’s views—which already had been repeated by London and
Bauer—including his omission of the doctrine of classical concepts. In particular, it
continued to promulgate the suggestion that measurement is a two-step process for
which the clariﬁcation of the ﬁrst step (i.e. of turning a pure state into a mixture)
would already be a major part of the solution of the measurement problem.
Wigner’s paper inspired for example the “‘Swiss” approach to the measurement
problem, which was remarkable in being the ﬁrst serious mathematical attempt to
take into account the Bohr–Heisenberg dogma that the apparatus be described classi-
cally, whilst also paying tribute to von Neumann in insisting on mathematical rigour.
Indeed, the Swiss approach relies on the formalism of operator algebras, which also
marks a conceptual break with all earlier—and indeed most later—approaches in
taking the observables rather than the states as a starting point. The aim of the Swiss
approach is to show that relative to a suitable class of observables, the pure state
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, ψ =∑cnψn,
coincides with the corresponding mixture without the off-diagonal terms, i.e.,
ρ ′ =∑
n
|cn|2|ψn〉〈ψn|.
Thus the ambition of this approach is limited, in that no attempt is made to explain
(at least the appearance of) single outcomes, except by appealing to the ignorance
interpretation of probability (in vain, see below). The alleged equivalence between
pure states and mixtures can typically be achieved if the apparatus is inﬁnite and
the measurement time is inﬁnite, too. The inﬁnite character of the apparatus (here
seen as an idealization of a macroscopic device, as is standard in quantum statistical
mechanics), is no guarantee for its classicality, but it is certainly a step in the right
direction (cf. Chapter 8). Thus two closely related problems must be overcome:
1. In its reliance on superselection sectors (technically, on disjoint states on a suit-
able algebra of observables of the apparatus, see Deﬁnition 8.18), the program
only works in the limit of inﬁnite apparatus and inﬁnite measurement time. In-
deed, any approximation ruins the equivalence between pure states and mixtures;
and hence even this limited solution to the problem violates Earman’s Principle.
2. In so far as the subsequent problem of obtaining single outcomes to measurement
is recognized in the Swiss approach at all, it seems to be addressed by an appeal to
the ignorance interpretation of probability. Despite the fact that the mathematical
situation in this respect is better than in ordinary quantum mechanics (where
the ignorance interpretation of the formal probability distribution given by the
coefﬁcients in a diagonal density operator is nonsensical, if only because the
state space is not a simplex), there is still no valid argument for this move.
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To explain the last point, we quote Leggett (though somewhat out of context):
‘Now, following Schro¨dinger, let us consider a thought experiment in which the quantum-
mechanical description of the ﬁnal state, as obtained by appropriate solution of the time de-
pendent Schrdinger equation, contains simultaneously nonzero probability amplitudes for
two or more states of the universe that are, by some reasonable criterion, macroscopically
distinct (in Schro¨dingers example, this would be “cat alive” and “cat dead”). Of course, just
about everyone, including me, would accept that because of, inter alia, the effects of deco-
herence, it is likely to be impossible, at least for the foreseeable future, to experimentally
demonstrate the interference of such states. (On the other hand, as the late John Bell was
fond of pointing out, the foreseeable future is not a very well-deﬁned concept. In fact, as
late as 1999, not a few people were conﬁdently arguing that because of the inevitable ef-
fects of decoherence, the projected experiments to demonstrate interference at the level of
ﬂux qubits would never work. In this case, the foreseeable future lasted approximately one
year. As Bell used to emphasize, the answers to fundamental interpretive questions should
not depend on the accident of what is or is not currently technologically feasible.) But the
crucial point is that the formalism of quantum mechanics itself has changed not one whit
between the microscopic and macroscopic levels. Are we then entitled to embrace, at the
macrolevel, an interpretation that was forbidden at the microlevel, simply because the ev-
idence against it is no longer available? I would argue very strongly that we are not, and
would therefore draw the conclusion: also at the macrolevel, when the quantum-mechanical
description assigns simultaneously nonzero [probabilities] to two or more macroscopically
distinct possibilities, then it is not the case that each system of the relevant ensemble realizes
either one possibility or the other.’ (Leggett, in Schlosshauer, 2011, p. 155)
This argument of Leggett’s (which is a special case of Earman’s Principle) was orig-
inally targeted at decoherence, but it also applies verbatim to the Swiss approach
(which is closely related to decoherence, as both heavily rely on limits and super-
selection rules—which are absolute in the former and dynamically induced in the
latter). In an even earlier hunch of Earman’s Principle, Bell— this time aiming di-
rectly at the Swiss approach—in fact made a related point about its reliance on the
t → ∞ limit (in that even at extremely large but ﬁnite time the state remains pure).
Jumping to the modern era, a striking point of continuity with the 1920s and
1930s is the idea that the measurement procedure (and hence the measurement prob-
lem) consists of two stages; only the terminology and the scope have changed:
‘There are two distinct measurement problems in quantum mechanics: what Pitowsky has
called a “big” measurement problem and a “small” measurement problem. The “big” mea-
surement problem is the problem of explaining how measurements can have deﬁnite out-
comes, given the unitary dynamics of the theory: it is the problem of explaining how in-
dividual measurement outcomes come about dynamically. The “small” measurement prob-
lem is the problem of accounting for our familiar experience of a classical, or Boolean,
macroworld, given the non-Boolean character of the underlying quantum event space: it is
the problem of explaining the dynamical emergence of an effectively classical probability.’
(Bub, in Schlosshauer, 2011, pp. 145–146)
Clearly, the “small” measurement problem is modern parlance for the problem
how to turn a superposition into a mixture, upon which the “big” problem—if it is
noticed at all—still concerns the old issue of selecting one term from this mixture.
Furthermore, the measurement problem seems to have acquired increased scope
and importance, as exempliﬁed by the following quotations:
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‘One of the most ancient philosophical questions (Heidegger thought is was the question) is
this: why is there something rather than nothing? In terms of events rather than substances,
the question would be: how come anything happens at all? That question is the measurement
problem.’ (Fine, in Schlosshauer, 2011, p. 146)
‘The measurement problem has been called “the reality problem” by Philip Pearle. This is
a better name for it. We perceive objects in the world as being in deﬁnite states. A door
is either open or shut, a given ball either is in a given box or it is not. The wave function,
however, can have superpositions of these things, suggesting that the door can be simultane-
ously open and shut at the same time, and that the ball can be both in the box and not in the
box at the same time. The reality problem is that there is a discrepancy between the version
of reality we perceive, and the version presented to us by the most obvious interpretation of
the wave function.’ (Hardy, in Schlosshauer, 2011, p. 153)
‘Fundamentally, the measurement problem is the problem of connecting probability with
truth in the quantum world, that is to say, it is the problem of how to relate quantum probabil-
ities to the objective occurrence and non-occurrence of events. The problem arises because
there appears to be a difﬁculty in reconciling the objectivity of a particular measurement
outcome with the entangled state at the end of a measurement.’ (Bub, ibid., p. 145)
More technically, the measurement problem has come to be seen as a special case
of the problem of explaining at least the appearance of the classical world from
quantum theory. If the measurement problem is seen from the Copenhagen perspec-
tive this is eminently reasonable, as both problems involve the dual description of
either the apparatus or the world around us as both classical and quantum (and its
possible failure). In this context, an alleged solution to the “small” problem, such as
Decoherence, is often also seen as this explanation (as if there were no issue about
the derivation of the laws of classical physics, including the dynamical ones).
A propos, another characteristic feature of the modern era is undoubtedly the
dominance of Decoherence (if only over the Swiss approach), for example:
‘I think the whole discussion about whether measurements in quantum mechanics are in-
deed problematic somewhat misses the point. Measurement interactions are only one of
many examples of quantum interactions that lead to superpositions of macroscopically dis-
tinct states. Nature has been producing macroscopic superpositions for millions of years,
well before any quantum physicist cared to artiﬁcially engineer such a situation. The key
concept here is decoherence. Environmental interactions tend to produce superpositions of
classically distinct states. This raises the issue of how one could describe a classical regime
in quantum mechanics, quite irrespective of the existence of measuring apparatuses. (. . . )
If decoherence and its applications had been developed early in the history of quantum
theory, then the idea that measurements play a special role in the theory might not have
risen to such prominence, and the foundations of quantum mechanics would have focused
instead on the problem of how to derive a classical regime within the theory.’
(Bacciagaluppi, in Schlosshauer, 2011, p. 143)
Mathematically, decoherence boils down to the idea of adding one more link to
the von Neumann chain (see §11.1) beyond S+A (i.e. the system and the apparatus).
Conceptually, however, there is a fundamental conceptual as well as technical dif-
ference between Decoherence and older approaches that took such a step: whereas
previously (e.g., in the hands of von Neumann, London & Bauer, and Wigner) the
chain converged towards the observer, in Decoherence it diverges away from the
observer. Namely, the third and ﬁnal link is now taken to be the environment.
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This notion is often taken in a fairly literal sense in agreement with the intuitive
meaning of the word, but it may also (we would even say: preferably) refer to inter-
nal degrees of freedom of the apparatus, as in the Spehner–Haake model in §11.4.
Either way, the “environment” is usually treated as an inﬁnite system (necessitating
a limit like N → ∞), which (in simple models where the pointer has discrete spec-
trum) has the consequence that the post-measurement state ∑n cnψn ⊗ φn ⊗ χn (in
which the χn are mutually orthogonal) is only reached not only in the limit N → ∞
of inﬁnitely many degrees of freedom but also in the limit t → ∞ of inﬁnite time. In
that case, the restriction of the above state to S+A (i.e. the trace of the corresponding
density operator over the degrees of freedom of the environment) is mixed, which
means that the quantum-mechanical interference between the states ψn⊗φn for dif-
ferent values of n has become “delocalized” to the environment, and accordingly is
deemed irrelevant if the latter is not observed (i.e. omitted from the description).
Unfortunately, in so far as it claims to provide a solution to the measurement
problem, Decoherence is an unmitigated disaster:
1. Decoherence actually aggravates the measurement problem: where previously
this problem was believed to be man-made and relevant only to rather unusual
laboratory situations, it has now become clear that “measurement” of a quantum
system by the environment (instead of by an experimental physicist) happens
everywhere and all the time: hence it remains even more miraculous than before
that there is a single outcome after each such measurement.
2. Even the need for one of the two limits N → ∞ or t → ∞ makes Decoherence
vulnerable to Earman’s Principle; see Bell’s and Leggett’s critiques above.
3. Like the Swiss approach, Decoherence suffers from the difﬁculty that even if it
were able to reach its goal of reducing pure states to mixtures (about which ability
one may have doubts), there is no sound follow-up step to solve the next problem
of selecting one term from the mixture produced in the previous step. The igno-
rance interpretation seems blocked by Leggett’s argument quoted above (i.e. his
continuity argument to the effect that Decoherence just removes the evidence for
a given Schro¨dinger’s cat state to be a superposition, elsewhere charging those
claiming that Decoherence solves the measurement problem of committing the
logical fallacy that removal of the evidence for a crime would undo the crime).
Thus Decoherence is parasitic on some interpretation of quantum mechanics that
solves the measurement problem, which in turn is typically strengthened by it. In
this context, the most popular of these has been the Everett (i.e., Many-Worlds)
Interpretation, which, after decades of obscurity or even derision, suddenly started to
be greeted with a ﬂourish of trumpets in the wake of the popularity of Decoherence.
However, even if such extravagant interpretations are coherent, these should in our
opinion be a very last resort, acceptable only if truly everything else has failed.
On the positive side, Decoherence has led to the important idea of einselection
(for environment-induced superselection), where a pure state ψ of some system
(possibly plus apparatus) is “einselected” if it remains pure after coupling to the
environment and subsequent restriction. The hope (or rather program), then, is to
show that classical states are classical precisely because they are robust in this way.
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Finally, it may be appropriate to close this historical introduction to the measure-
ment problem by mentioning another modern approach, namely outright denial:
‘I remember giving a talk at a meeting at the London School of Economics seven or so years
ago. In the audience was an Oxford philosophy professor, and I suppose he didn’t much like
my brash cowboy dismissal of a good bit of his life’s work. When the question session came
around, he took me to task with the most proper and polite scorn I had ever heard (I guess
that’s what they do). “Excuse me. You seem to have made an important point in your talk,
and I want to make sure that I have not misunderstood anything. Are you saying that you
have solved the measurement problem? This problem that has plagued quantum mechanics
for seventy-ﬁve years? The message of your talk is that, using quantum information theory,
you have ﬁnally solved it?” (Funny the way the words could be put together as a question,
but have no intended usage but as a statement.) I don’t know that I did anything but turn the
screw on him a bit further, but I remember my answer. “No, not me; I havent done anything.
What I am saying is that a “measurement problem” never existed in the ﬁrst place. (. . . )
The “measurement problem” is purely an artefact of a wrong-headed view of what quan-
tum states and/or quantum probabilities ought to be. (. . . ) quantum states are not real things
from a Quantum Bayesian view (. . . ) but a personal judgment, a quantiﬁed degree of belief.
A quantum state is a set of numbers an agent uses to guide the gambles he might take on
the consequences of his potential interactions with a quantum system. It has no more sub-
stantiality than that. Aren’t epistemic states real things? Well . . . yes, in a way. They are as
real as the people who hold them. But no one would consider a person to be a property of
the quantum system he happens to be contemplating. And one shouldn’t think of a quantum
state in that way either—one shouldnt think of it as a property of the quantum system to
which it is assigned. Take the source of the paradox away, we say, and the paradox itself
will go away.’ (Fuchs, in Schlosshauer, 2011, pp. 146–147)
These words have been quoted at some length, because the view that “physics is
information” and its alleged corollary that all foundational problems are solved by
Bayesian reasoning (perhaps with a quantum ﬂavour) is becoming increasingly pop-
ular. Physicist are now seen as punters (or, in academic parlance, “agents”) who
in smoky ofﬁces bet on the outcomes of experiments, and hence use (quantum)
Dutch Book arguments to justify some sort of strictly epistemic (quantum) proba-
bility calculus. However, the ideology of “QBism” thus expressed appears to have
adopted precisely the weakest ingredients of the Copenhagen Interpretation—viz.
the idea that the wave-function is just a catalogue of the probabilities for possible
outcomes of measurements whose details are supposedly beyond our grasp, cf. the
Introduction—at the expense of its one strong component, namely the doctrine of
classical concepts. Although there may have been pragmatic reasons for this atti-
tude in the 1920s, (mathematical) physics has moved forward since then, enabling
much more detailed analysis and hence justifying considerably greater ambition in
understanding the measurement process than Bohr and Heisenberg cum suis had.
In any case, the fact that one competent author regards the measurement problem
as the key to reality whilst another ﬂatly denies even its very existence should give
pause for thought. As in the Bohr–Einstein debate, different perspectives on reality
and on the task of physics seem to play a role here, culminating in contrasting views
of quantum-mechanical states: the more “reality” one attributes to states, the more
serious the measurement problem is. Or, contrapositively, the more operationalist
one’s attitude, the further the problem disappears behind the horizon.
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11.3 Insolubility theorems
Since in §11.4 we will “propose the impossible”, namely miraculously solving the
measurement problem within unitary quantum mechanics, it is helpful to review the
arguments why this is generally felt to be impossible. Such arguments take the form
of so-called insolubility theorems. As already mentioned, such theorems ultimately
go back to von Neumann: especially those that prove the impossibility of explaining
his process 1 (i.e. the transition from a pure state to a mixture) from process 2
(unitary time evolution according to the Schro¨dinger equation). Another kind of
insolubility theorem shows that single outcomes are impossible from process 2.
It might be argued that both kinds of theorem add little to the basic mathematical
intuition behind the measurement problem, which is as follows (it goes without
saying that we disagree with this traditional description of measurement, see below).
Let s ∈ B(HS) be the observable being measured (where HS is some Hilbert space
associated to a quantum object S undergoing measurement) and let a ∈ B(HA) be
a “pointer observable” correlated to S (where HA is a second Hilbert space). In
particular, the measurement apparatus A is described quantum mechanically. For the
moment we assume both Hilbert spaces to be ﬁnite-dimensional and both operators
to be non-degenerate, even having the same spectrum {λ1, . . . ,λn}; this of course
implies that dim(HS) = dim(HA) = n. Thus HS has a basis (υ
(s)
i ) of eigenvectors of
s and likewise HA has a basis (υ
(a)
i ) of eigenvectors of a, with sυ
(s)
i = λiυ
(s)
i and
aυ(a)i = λiυ
(a)
i (i= 1, . . . ,n). The (erroneous) argument, then, is as follows:
1. Measurement should establish a correlation between values of s of S and values
of a of A, which with the above labeling implies that for each i the initial sys-
tem state υ(s)i should push the pointer from some initial state ψ
(A)
0 into a ﬁnal
(post-measurement) state υ(a)i . Hence the dynamics, described by some unitary
operator u ∈ B(HS⊗HA), should be such that
u(υ(s)i ⊗ψ0) = υ(s)i ⊗υ(a)i ≡ ϕi. (11.1)
2. If the initial system state is ψ(S)0 = ∑i ciυ
(s)
i (with ∑i |ci|2 = 1), then, by linearity
of u, the ﬁnal state is ϕ = ∑i ciϕi. But if A is sufﬁciently macroscopic this con-
ﬂicts with observation, which always shows one of the terms in the sum. In other
words, in theory, a—more precisely, 1HS ⊗a—has no value in this state, whereas
in practice it does, since in the real world measurements do have outcomes.
3. Hence the ﬁnal state should be the mixed density operator ∑i |ci|2|ϕi〉〈ϕi| (rather
than the pure one |ϕ〉〈ϕ|), whose ignorance interpretation (allegedly) yields one
of the states ϕi with probability |ci|2. But it is impossible to transform the initial
pure state |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0| into the above mixture by any unitary operator, let alone by
the u deﬁned by (11.1), which by construction yields
u|ψ(S)0 〉〈ψ(S)0 |u∗ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| =∑
i
|ci|2|ϕi〉〈ϕi|. (11.2)
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As we already discussed, for some authors the measurement problem is the clash be-
tween nos. 1 and 3 (this is the “small” problem), whereas for others it is the conﬂict
between nos. 1 and 2 (i.e. the “big” one). Either way, the goal of insolubility theo-
rems is to show that the problem is not a consequence of idealizations in primitive
arguments like the one just given, but remains even under very general assumptions.
In particular, both the purity of the initial system as well as apparatus states (and
hence of their tensor product), and the exact system-apparatus correlation assumed
(including the premise of point spectra and ﬁnite-dimensional Hilbert spaces), can
be considerably relaxed. To illustrate the kind of discussion, we present one example
of an insolubility proof along the former lines and one along the latter. These proofs
even remain valid if the notion of an observable itself is relaxed, too, namely from
a self-adjoint operator to a POVM (see (2.178)), but we will not discuss this utmost
generality (if only because it would not circumvent our critique below). It should be
noted that insolubility theorems tacitly assume that the mathematical objects in the
quantum-mechanical formalism describe all there is physically.
In the ﬁrst direction, we have Theorem 11.2 below, which we may summarize as
the problem of statistics: there is a contradiction between the following postulates:
1. System and apparatus are both described quantum-mechanically.
2. The wave-function of the system is complete.
3. The wave-function always evolves linearly (e.g., by the Schro¨dinger equation).
4. Measurements with identical initial wave-functions may have different out-
comes, and the probability of each possible outcome is given by the Born rule.
Here the second and third postulates may be consequences of the ﬁrst, but even so
it is useful to list them separately, since denying or circumventing nos. 1, 2, and 3 is
typically done in completely different ways (see the end of this section).
Formally, let s = s∗ ∈ B(HS) be an arbitrary self-adjoint operator on an arbitrary
(separable) Hilbert space HS, with associated spectral projections e
(s)
Δ ∈P(HS),
Δ ⊂ σ(s), and likewise a ∈ B(HA). It is convenient (and entails no genuine loss of
generality) to still assume that σ(s) = σ(a). Recall that the Born measure μ(s)ρS on
the spectrum σ(s) induced by some density operator ρS ∈D(HS) is given by
μ(s)ρS (Δ) = Tr
(
ρSe
(s)
Δ
)
= ωS
(
e(s)Δ
)
= μ(s)ωS (Δ), (11.3)
cf. (4.9), where ωS is the state associated to ρS by (2.33), and no notational confusion
between μ(s)ρS and μ
(s)
ωS should arise (they are the same thing). Likewise for a.
Deﬁnition 11.1. 1. Let H be a Hilbert space and let b ∈ B(H)sa. Two (normal)
states ω,ω ′ on B(H) are called b-distinguishable if μ(b)ω = μ(b)ω ′ ; in other words,
there is some Δ ⊂ σ(b) such that μ(b)ω (Δ) = μ(b)ω ′ (Δ). Similarly for ρ,ρ ′ ∈D(H).
2. In the situation described before (11.3), a pair (ρA,u), where ρA is a density
operator on B(HA) and u is a unitary operator on HS ⊗HA, is a measurement
scheme for s if s-distinguishability of two density operators ρS, ρ ′S on HS implies
1HS ⊗a -distinguishability of the two states u(ρS⊗ρA)u∗ and u(ρ ′S⊗ρA)u∗.
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3. A measurement scheme (ρA,u) for s preserves probabilities if for any density
operator ρS ∈D(HS) the probability measure on σ(a) = σ(1HS ⊗a) induced by
u(ρS⊗ρA)u∗ equals the Born measure μ(s)ρS on σ(s) = σ(a) induced by ρS.
4. A density operator ρ ∈D(HS⊗HA) objectiﬁes the pointer observable a relative
to some countable partition σ(a) =
⊔
i Δi of its spectrum if ρ = ∑i pieυi , where
each unit vector υi ∈ HS⊗HA is an eigenvector of 1HS ⊗ e(a)Δi (pi ≥ 0, ∑i pi = 1).
For example, in case of a discrete spectrumf or simplicity, if λ1 = λ2 in σ(b), then
any two unit eigenvectors υ(b)i (i = 1,2) give rise to b-distinguishable vector states
ρi = |υ(b)i 〉〈υ(b)i |. If ψ = c1υ(b)1 + c2υ(b)2 with |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1 and c1 = 0,1, then
also the trio (ρ1,ρ2,eψ) is pairwise b-distinguishable. If, the other hand, λ ∈ σ(b)
is degenerate, then eψ and eψ ′ fail to b-distinguishable whenever ψ,ψ ′ ∈ Hλ .
Clause 2 of Deﬁnition 11.1—which incorporates a vast number of at least theo-
retical scenario’s—is a considerable weakening of the scheme (11.1), while clause
3 sharpens the second, implying that measurement transfers all Born probabilities
for the object to the apparatus, probabilistically making the latter a mirror image
of the former. Clause 4 ﬁrstly takes care of continuous spectra; if σ(a) is discrete,
one may simply partition it by its points (a partition of σ(a) is sometimes called
a reading scale). The “objectiﬁcation” terminology is questionable (if not outright
misleading), as it is motivated by the ignorance interpretation of mixtures (see be-
low), but we follow the literature in using it. In what follows, we exclude the trivial
cases where σ(s) consist of a single point, and/or σ(a) is partitioned by itself.
Theorem 11.2. For any nontrivial object observable s and partitioning of σ(a),
there exists no measurement scheme (ρA,u) for s whose ﬁnal state u(ρS⊗ρA)u∗ ob-
jectiﬁes a for any initial system state ρS (let alone one that preserves probabilities).
Proof. Since we will not use this theorem (except for pointing out that it attacks a
straw man), we just prove it in the special case where σ(a) is discrete and parti-
tioned by its points, and also the spectral decomposition ρA = ∑n pnen of the initial
apparatus state is unique, cf. (B.490). For any unit vector in υ(s) ∈ HS we then have
u(eυ(s) ⊗ρA)u∗ =∑
n
pnu(eυ(s) ⊗ en)u∗. (11.4)
Take λ1 = λ2 in σ(s), with associated eigenvectors υ(s)1 and υ(s)2 . If en = |αn〉〈αn|,
for unit vectors αn ∈ HA, then objectiﬁcation of a requires that each of the vectors
u(υ(s)1 ⊗αn), u(υ(s)2 ⊗αn), u((c1υ(s)1 + c2)υ(s)2 ⊗αn),
with |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1 and c1 = 0,1, must be an eigenvector of 1HS ⊗a. This is only
possible if the ﬁrst two vectors (and hence the third) lie in the same eigenspace for
1HS ⊗a, but in that case condition no. 2 in Deﬁnition 11.1 is violated, since the three
given initial system states are pairwise s-distinguishable whereas the corresponding
outcomes states just listed evidently fail to be 1HS ⊗a-distinguishable. 
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Insolubility theorems of the second kind describe the problem of outcomes, ac-
cording to which clauses 1., 2., and 3. of the problem of statistics also contradict:
4’. Measurements have determinate outcomes.
Technical statements to this effect are even more straightforward than those for-
malizing the problem of statistics. We keep HS and s ∈ B(HS) as they were, but this
time, HA may refer to the rest of the Universe outside the quantum object described
by HS (which includes the pointer, of course). Here is the key assumption.
Deﬁnition 11.3. Let s ∈ B(HS)sa be an object observable with partition σ(s) =⊔
i∈I Δi of its spectrum (if σ(s) = {λ1, . . .} is discrete, one may take Δi = {λi}),
and let HA be a second Hilbert space. A sound measurement scheme consists of:
• A collection (Si)i∈I of outcome spaces, i.e. subsets of the (normal) state space,
Si ⊂ Sn(HS⊗HA)∼=D(HS⊗HA), (11.5)
for which there is 0≤ η < 1/2 such that for i = j, one has
2
√
1−η ≤ ‖ωi−ω j‖ ≤ 2 (ωi ∈ Si,ω j ∈ S j). (11.6)
• A pair (ρA,u), where ρA is a density operator on B(HA) and u is a unitary on
HS⊗HA, such that for each i ∈ I and each unit vector υ(s)i ∈ HΔi (i.e., eΔiυ(s)i =
υ(s)i ), the state u(eυ(s)i
⊗ρA)u∗ (i.e. the outcome of the measurement) lies in Si.
In (11.6) the ﬁrst bound (which for small η is ≈ (2−η) ≤ ·· · ) is the key one, as
the last one ≤ 2 is always satisﬁed and has been included for clarity. In particular,
‖ωi−ω j‖>
√
2. (11.7)
Note that (11.6) implies that the Si must be disjoint, since assuming ω ∈ Si gives
‖ω −ω j‖ ≥ 2
√
1−η for all ω j ∈ S j, whereas ω ∈ S j allows one to take ω j = ω
in this inequality, leading to the contradiction 0 ≥ 2√1−η . Note that in terms of
density operators we have
‖ωi−ω j‖= ‖ρi−ρ j‖1, (11.8)
where ωi(a) = Tr(ρia), cf. (B.481) and Theorem B.146. If ωi and ω j are pure,
induced by unit vectors ψi and ψ j in HS ⊗HA, then by (C.637), eq. (11.6) comes
down to
0≤ |〈ψi,ψ j〉|2 ≤ η . (11.9)
For example, in the von Neumann measurement scheme (11.1), the subspace Si just
consist of the vector state deﬁned by υ(s)i ⊗υ(a)i , hence (11.6) holds with η = 0.
Theorem 11.4. For any nontrivial object observable s and partitioning of σ(s), any
sound measurement scheme ((Si),η ,ρA,u) admits initial states υ ∈ HS such that
u(eυ ⊗ρA)u∗ (i.e. the post-measurement state) does not lie in any outcome space Si.
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Proof. Let υ = (υi+υ j)/
√
2, where i = j and for the moment υi and υ j are merely
orthonormal vectors in HS. For each i= 1,2 we then compute:
‖u(eυ ⊗ρA)u∗ −u(eυi ⊗ρA)u∗‖(HS⊗HA)1 = ‖eυ ⊗ρA− eυi ⊗ρA‖(HS⊗HA)1
= ‖eυ − eυi‖(HS)1
= ‖ωυ −ωυi‖
= 2
√
1−|〈υ ,υi〉|2
=
√
2, (11.10)
where ‖ ·‖(H)1 denotes the trace norm relative to H. Now take υi = υ(s)i as in Deﬁni-
tion 11.3. Since ωi ≡ u(eυ(s)i ⊗ρA)u
∗ ∈ Si by deﬁnition of a sound measurement, it
follows from (11.7) and (11.10) that ω ≡ u(eυ ⊗ρA)u∗ cannot lie in any subspace
Sk, since that would require ‖ω −ωl‖ >
√
2 for all l = k, whereas (11.10) shows
that this inequality fails for at least two values of l, viz. l = i and l = j = i. 
In order to circumvent Theorems 11.2 and 11.4, one should deny at least one of
their explicit premises. Moreover, we note that postulate no. 3 (i.e. linearity of time-
evolution) is always implicitly used in the form of the following counterfactual:
If ψn were the initial state, then for each n it would evolve (linearly) according
to the Schro¨dinger equation with given Hamiltonian h. If the initial state were
∑n cnψn, also then it would evolve according to the same Hamiltonian h.
This counterfactual should be added as a tacit assumption to all insolubility proofs
(and also to informal statements of the measurement problem). As such, it may
reasonably be denied (see §11.4), and such a denial puts assumption no. 4 in the
problem of statistics in perspective, namely by denying the possibility that identical
initial states can always be prepared in such a way that they evolve through exactly
the same Hamiltonian. This leaves room for the following denials of some premise:
¬ 1. The apparatus is not described quantum-mechanically;
¬ 2. The wave-function of the system is not complete;
¬ 3. The wave-function does not always evolve by the Schro¨dinger equation;
¬ 4. Identical initial wave-functions always yield identical outcomes;
¬ 4’. Measurements do not have determinate outcomes.
Current programs for solving the measurement problem neatly fall into this scheme:
¬ 1. Copenhagen Interpretation and Swiss Approach;
¬ 2. Hidden-variable theories, most prominently Bohmian mechanics;
¬ 3. Dynamical collapse theories (such as GRW);
¬ 4. Instability approaches, e.g., the Flea on Schro¨dinger’s Cat (which keeps 3);
¬ 4’. Many-Worlds Interpretation, i.e., Everettian quantum mechanics.
Leaving most of these to the literature, we now turn to the instability approach (¬4).
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11.4 The Flea on Schro¨dinger’s Cat
The conclusion of this lengthy historical and technical introduction is that there are
(at least) two different formulations of the measurement problem, whose insolubility
is expressed by Theorems 11.2 and 11.4, respectively (leaving apart lavish opportu-
nities for disagreement about the precise formulation of the underlying assumptions,
and not even speaking about the outright dismissal of the whole issue as a Schein-
problem). Thus the problem in question is evidently of a different kind from say the
famous open conjectures in mathematics (like the Riemann hypothesis), where it is
clear what the theorem is that needs to be proved. Nonetheless, despite its undeni-
able philosophical aspects, we see the measurement problem as a genuine physics
problem concerned with the discrepancy between (quantum) theory and experiment,
to be addressed by mathematical, physical, and philosophical analysis.
Well aware that different people typically draw different lessons from history,
we will now, in the interest of motivating our approach to follow, draw our own
(necessarily subjective) conclusions from the history of the measurement problem.
1. Though grounded in genius and tradition (Heisenberg, von Neumann, Wigner),
the two-step way of looking at the measurement process (i.e. in terms of ﬁrstly
a reduction of the wave-function by some non-unitary “process 1” and secondly
a registration of a single outcome), with ensuing separation of the measurement
problem into a “small” and a “big” problem, is fruitless and should be abandoned.
It has no basis whatsoever in experimental physics (where the alleged mixed
post-measurement states are conspicuously absent), it reﬂects obsolete ensemble
thinking, and it is unsound also theoretically, as shown both by the ﬁrst kind of
insolubility results (a` la von Neumann and Theorem 11.2), as well as by the fail-
ure of programs addressing just the “small” problem (like the Swiss approach
and Decoherence). These approaches are unable to deal with the “big” problem
(except perhaps through desperate remedies like Many Worlds) and hence, even
if they work, they deliver Pyrrhic victories at best. The problem of obtaining sin-
gle outcomes should be solved directly, before it is too late. Since such a solution
would leave nothing to interfere, the “small” problem automatically disappears.
This does not mean that it is sufﬁcient to obtain deﬁnite outcomes alone; among
all remaining challenges, deriving the Born rule stands out in particular.
2. Too much formal analysis has been done on the measurement problem (including
the insolubility theorems just reviewed) without taking the special nature of mea-
surement devices into account; alas, this negligence has its roots in the work of
von Neumann. These devices are typically treated as ordinary quantum systems,
as a consequence of which the notion of an “outcome” has to be deﬁned within
quantum mechanics and hence has to be identiﬁed e.g. with an eigenstate of some
operator describing the apparatus (as in Theorem 11.2) or with some subspace of
the quantum-mechanical state space (as in Theorem 11.4). Such identiﬁcations
are purely formal and have little basis in experimental physics: as long as one
deﬁnes outcomes of measurements within quantum mechanics, there is no mea-
surement problem (but at worst some unease concerning value indeﬁniteness)!
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Fig. 11.1 The waves crashed between the towering cliff of Scylla and the jagged rocks of Charyb-
dis. Colour litograph by Gino D’Antonio. Reprinted with permission from Look and Learn Ltd.
On the other hand, both the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Swiss approach
seem to have gone too far in the opposite direction: the former because it simply
assumed (without providing any justiﬁcation) that measurements have outcomes
as soon as the apparatus is described classically, the latter in treating apparatuses
as strictly inﬁnite, and hence falling victim to Earman’s Principle. The right ap-
proach, then, must be to deﬁne measurement as in the Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion, i.e. using a classical description of the apparatus whilst realizing it is on-
tologically a quantum system, and thusly navigate between Scylla (who treats
measurement devices as arbitrary quantum systems) and Charybdis (who is too
enthusiastic in taking inﬁnite limits and hence in using a classical description).
3. Some kind of reality has to be attributed to the state of the system (though this
reality cannot be “absolute”, as in classical physics). In the algebraic approach
to quantum theory adopted throughout the present book, the starting point is pro-
vided by the observables, relative to which states are deﬁned. Since the doctrine
of classical concepts drives us to switch between quantum-mechanical and clas-
sical descriptions, the reality of the quantum state is therefore perspectival. How-
ever, their perspectival nature does not make states less real; they say everything
there is to say (at least by quantum theory) about some given level of description
(which may be said to be chosen by the observer, and hence is intersubjective).
Thus the measurement problem arises in the way Schro¨dinger (rather than von Neu-
mann) described it, although a precise framework has to be added to his poetry.
A framework that is precise both conceptually and mathematically is offered by
asymptotic emergence, which we already encountered in our discussion of SSB in
the previous chapter (see especially its preamble). To repeat the main points, we
speak of asymptotic emergence if the following three conditions are all satisﬁed:
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1. A “higher-level theory” H (which in the context of the measurement problem is
either classical mechanics or classical thermodynamics, depending on the mea-
surement setup) is a limiting case of some “lower-level theory” L (viz. quantum
mechanics, including quantum statistical mechanics of a ﬁnite system).
2. Theory H is well deﬁned and understood by itself (typically predating L).
3. Theory H has “emergent” features that cannot be explained by L, e.g. because L
does not have any property inducing those feature(s) in the limit pertinent to H.
The root of the measurement problem (and hence the relevance of asymptotic emer-
gence), then, lies in Bohr’s requirement that the outcomes of measurements on sys-
tems deﬁned within L be recorded in (at the least the language of) H, so that, cru-
cially, measurement according to L is a notion external to L (if only partly), in par-
ticular involving the relationship between L and H. None of the insolubility proofs
of the measurement problem take this into account (although due to Butterﬁeld’s
Principle these proofs remain relevant in a secondary way). The typical feature of
H that would be emergent in the above sense if the measurement problem were un-
resolved is that every physical system subject to the theory H is ontologically in
a pure state; in Schro¨dinger’s words quoted in §11.1: in H, sharply focused pho-
tographs of states are always possible (and hence any uncertainty or chance is due
to ignorance, as in classical physics). Now, whatever the ontological nature of states
in L, the states they induce in H should be real in the above sense, i.e., pure. But
this is precisely what does not seem to be the case in typical measurement situations
(e.g., Schro¨dinger’s Cat), where the post-measurement state on L induces a mixed
state on H. Just as in the case of SSB, this violates Butterﬁeld’s Principle, which in
the case at hand states that since H is an idealization of L, any physical effect in H
must be foreshadowed in L: as L approaches H, sharp measurement outcomes (de-
ﬁned as pure states in H) must arise from at least approximate single measurement
outcomes (i.e. “singly-peaked wave-functions”) in the relevant asymptotic regime
of L (since only these wave-functions gives rise to pure classical states on H).
As noted before in the setting of SSB: violating Butterﬁeld’s Principle means
violating Earman’s Principle, which in turn leads to a violation of the link between
theory and reality. It is worth spelling this out for the measurement problem:
• Reality is described by quantum mechanics (even in the Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion, classical mechanics is an idealization of quantum mechanics);
• Real phenomena—in this case, sharp measurement outcomes— are correctly de-
scribed by classical mechanics although this is an idealization;
• Quantum mechanics (allegedly) cannot possibly induce these phenomena in its
limit towards classical mechanics although it is the theory that should apply;
• Hence quantum mechanics contradicts reality. Classical mechanics does not con-
tradict the reality of sharp measurement outcomes, but it is not the appropriate
theory to explain them; this explanation should come from quantum mechanics.
It may now seem that invoking Butterﬁeld’s Principle has reduced the measure-
ment problem to the usual one(s) described in the preceding sections. But look at
the small print: in the Copenhagen Interpretation, single measurement outcomes
only appear in some limiting “classical” regime of quantum mechanics.
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“Deep inside” quantum mechanics, there is no need at all for the typical superpo-
sition ∑n cnψn to collapse into one of the states ψn (unless one conﬂates the physical
measurement problem with the philosophical problem of value indeﬁniteness). The
external and asymptotic nature of measurement outcomes causes the measurement
problem, but, as we shall see, at the same time it provides the key for its solution,
since the collapse mechanism we propose is only effective asymptotically (so that it
operates where it should and does not act where it should not). More precisely, by
taking into account perturbations of the Hamiltonian that are tiny and ineffective in
the quantum regime, but become hugely destabilizing in the classical regime (even
before the actual limit), the wave-function of the apparatus will collapse.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, “our” measurement problem states that:
• Certain pure post-measurement states of an (ontologically quantum-mechanical!)
apparatus coupled to a microscopic quantum object induce mixed states on the
apparatus (and on the composite) once the apparatus is described classically.
This is a precise version of Schro¨dinger’s Cat problem (rather than von Neumann’s
purely quantum-mechanical measurement problem), making it clear that at heart the
problem does not lie with the (dis)appearance of interference terms (which is a red
herring) but with the inability of quantum mechanics to predict single outcomes.
We now show by means of a simple example what it means to describe an on-
tologically quantum-mechanical apparatus classically, and outline the scenario we
envisage for the solution of the measurement problem on the basis of this example.
The Spehner–Haake model of the apparatus described below is too simple to be
realistic, but nonetheless it may serve its purpose (as Bohr would say). The model
involves a double-well potential like (10.11), modiﬁed however by a little basin in
the middle, as shown below (including ground states for one large and one small
value of h¯). Also here, SSB will play a crucial role, so please recall §10.1.
Fig. 11.2 Double-well potential with basin; ground state ψ(0)h¯=0.5 and ψ
(0)
h¯=0.01.
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Consider N′ ≡ N + 1 non-interacting particles, each with mass m, moving on
the real line under the inﬂuence of a one-particle potential V (note that although
the zero’th particle with be handled lightly differently from the others, it is not the
pointer!). In terms of the canonical coordinates (p′,q′) = (p0, . . . , pN ,q0, . . . ,qN) ∈
R2N
′
on the phase space X = T ∗RN′ the classical Hamiltonian is
h(p′,q′) =
N
∑
n′=0
(
p2n′
2m
+V (qn′)
)
. (11.11)
Now perform a canonical transformation to center of mass and relative coordinates
P=
N
∑
n′=0
pn′ Q=
1
N′
N
∑
n′=0
qn′ ; (11.12)
πn =
√
N′pn− 1√
N′
N
∑
n′=0
pn′ ρn =
1√
N′
(qn−q0) (n= 1, . . . ,N); (11.13)
the center of mass (P,Q) will be the pointer. The inverse transformation is given by
p0 =
P
N′
− 1√
N′
N
∑
n=1
πn; (11.14)
pn =
P
N′
+
1√
N′
πn; (11.15)
q0 = Q− 1√
N′
N
∑
n=1
ρn; (11.16)
qn = Q+
√
N′ρn− 1√
N′
N
∑
k=1
ρk. (11.17)
Granted that {pn′ ,qk′ }= δn′k′ , {pn′ , pk′ }= 0, and {qn′ ,qk′ }= 0, we then duly have
{P,Q}= 1 and {πn,ρk}= δnk, with all other elementary Poisson brackets vanishing.
In terms of the new coordinates, the classical Hamiltonian (11.11) reads
h(P,Q,π,ρ) = hA(P,Q)+hAE(Q,ρ)+hE(π), (11.18)
where π = (π1, . . . ,πN), ρ = (ρ1, . . . ,ρN), and the three partial Hamiltonians are
hA(P,Q) =
P2
2M
+N′V (Q); (11.19)
hE(π) =
1
2M
⎛⎝ N∑
n=1
π2n +
(
N
∑
n=1
πn
)2⎞⎠ ; (11.20)
hAE(Q,ρ) =
∞
∑
k=1
1
k!
fk(ρ)V (k)(Q), (11.21)
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where M = Nm is the total mass of the system, for simplicity we assumed V to be
analytic (it will even be taken to be polynomial), and we abbreviated
fk(ρ) =
(
− 1√
N′
N
∑
l=1
ρl
)k
+
N
∑
n=1
(√
N′ρn− 1√
N′
N
∑
l=1
ρl
)k
. (11.22)
Note that f1(ρ) = 0, so that to lowest order (i.e. k = 2) we have
hAE(Q,ρ) =
(
1
2N
N
∑
n=1
ρ2n −
N
∑
k =l
ρkρl
)
V ′′(Q)+ · · · (11.23)
We pass to the corresponding quantum-mechanical Hamiltonians in the usual way,
and couple a two-level quantum system to the apparatus through the Hamiltonian
hSA = μ ·σ3⊗P, (11.24)
where the object observable s= σ3, acting on HS =C2, is to be measured. The idea
is that hA is the Hamiltonian of a pointer that registers outcomes by localization on
the real line, hE is the (free) Hamiltonian of the “environment”, realized as the in-
ternal degrees of the freedom of the total apparatus that are not used in recording
the outcome of the measurement, and hAE describes the pointer-environment inter-
action. The classical description of the apparatus then involves two approximations:
• Ignoring all degrees of freedom except those of A, which classically are (P,Q);
• Taking the classical limit of hA, here realized as N → ∞ (in lieu of h¯→ 0).
The measurement of s is now expected to unfold according to the following scenario:
1. The apparatus is initially in a metastable state (this is a very common assump-
tion), whose wave-function is e.g. a Gaussian centered at the origin.
2. If the object state is “spin up”, i.e., ψS = (1,0), then it kicks the pointer to the
right, where it comes to a standstill at the bottom of the double well. If spin is
down, likewise to the left. If ψS =(1,1)/
√
2, the pointer moves to a superposition
of these, which is close to the ground state of V displayed in Figure 11.2.
3. In the last case, the Flea mechanism of §10.2 comes into play: tiny asymmetric
perturbations irrelevant for small N localize the ground state as N → ∞.
4. Mere localization of the ground state of the perturbed (apparatus) Hamiltonian in
the classical regime is not enough: there should be a dynamical transition from
the ground state of the original (unperturbed) Hamiltonian (which has become
metastable upon perturbation) to the ground state of the perturbed one. This dy-
namical mechanism in question should also recover the Born rule.
Thus the classical description of the apparatus is at the same time the root of the
measurement problem and the key to its solution: it creates the problem because at
ﬁrst sight a Schro¨dinger Cat state has the wrong classical limit (namely a mixture),
but it also solves it, because precisely in the classical limit Cat states are destabilized
even by the tiniest (asymmetric) perturbations and collapse to the “right” states.
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The “ﬂea” perturbation might itself be a genuine random process, perhaps ulti-
mately of quantum origin. In that case, the measurement merely ampliﬁes the ran-
domness that was already inherent in the ﬂea by transferring it to the apparatus.
Alternatively, the ﬂea might be fundamentally deterministic (though it may
nonetheless be modeled stochastically for pragmatic reasons). In principle, this
would open the door to a restoration of determinism: for the ﬂea now transfers its
determinism (rather than its randomness) to the apparatus. The mistaken impression
that quantum theory implies the irreducible randomness of nature then arises be-
cause although measurement outcomes are determined, they are unpredictable “for
all practical purposes”, even in a way that (because of the exponential sensitivity to
the ﬂea in 1/h¯ or N) dwarfs the unpredictability of classical chaotic systems.
Either way, the ﬂea perturbation would naturally be different at each different run
of an experiment under otherwise identical initial conditions, which motivates our
critique of the counterfactual discussed after the proof of Theorem 11.4.
The location of the ﬂea plays a similar role to the position variable in Bohmian
mechanics, i.e., it is essentially a hidden variable. Recall the notions of Outcome
Independence (OI) and Parameter Independence (PI), reviewed in §6.5. Brieﬂy, the
conjunction of OI and PI is equivalent to Bell’s locality condition, and if the latter
is satisﬁed, then the Bell inequalities hold. Since these are violated by quantum
mechanics, any hidden variable theory compatible with quantum mechanics must
violate OI or PI. Deterministic hidden variable theories necessarily satisfy OI, in
which case Bell’s Theorem or the Free Will Theorem shows that they must violate
PI in order to be compatible with quantum mechanics. A violation of PI leads to
possible superluminal signaling only if the hidden variable z can be controlled. If
the wave-function ψ is regarded as the hidden variable, then quantum theory itself
satisﬁes PI but violates OI (since ψ can be prepared, the other way round would be
disastrous). Qua deterministic hidden variable theory, Bohmian mechanics satisﬁes
OI, and hence it violates PI; for the GRW collpase theory it is the other way round.
The fate of the ﬂea therefore depends on the nature of the perturbation: if it is
deterministic, the theory behaves like Bohmian mechanics in this respect and hence
violates PI, whereas stochastic perturbations typically violate OI (and possibly also
PI). Either way, no conﬂict with the said theorems arises. Moreover, in the Colbeck–
Renner Theorem, assumption CP fails for the ﬂea scenario—assuming, in view of
its limitation to ﬁnite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, the theorem is applicable at all!
Besides such issues, others remain to be resolved, of which we just mention two:
1. Collapse of the wave-function has become a tunneling process, whose static ef-
fects are exponentially enhanced as N → ∞ (or h¯ → 0, as in §10.2). However,
tunneling times increase in the same way, so that the environment is needed not
only to provide the perturbation, but also to speed up the dynamics of collapse.
2. The ﬂea not only destabilizes the Schro¨dinger Cat state (as desired), but also
destabilizes the intended outcome states (like those in Si, cf. Theorem 11.4). Also
here the environment should play a decisive role in (re)stabilizing the latter but
not the former, possibly through the mechanism of einselection, cf. §11.2.
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Notes
§11.1. The rise of orthodoxy
The literature on the measurement problem is vast. Apart from the annotated
reprint volume Wheeler & Zurek (1983), relatively recent surveys of and books
include Bell (1990b), Maudlin (1995), Busch, Lahti, & Mittelstaedt (1996), Bassi
& Ghirardi (2003), Mittelstaedt (2004), Wallace (2012), Allahverdyan, Balian, &
Nieuwenhuizen (2013), and Busch, Lahti, Pellonpa¨a¨, & Ylinen, (2016). In modal
interpretations of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem is (dubiously) con-
ﬂated with the far milder problem of value indeﬁniteness, see e.g. Bub (1997).
§11.2. The rise of modernity: Swiss approach and Decoherence
The Swiss approach to the measurement problem was initiated by Jauch (1964),
to be continued by e.g. Hepp (1972), Emch & Whitten-Wolfe (1976), and recently
also by Hepp’s former student Fro¨hlich; see e.g. Fro¨hlich & Schubnel (2013) and
Blanchard, Fro¨hlich & Schubnel (2016). In addition, see Landsman (1991, 1995)—
now seen as naive—, Breuer, Amann & Landsman (1993), and Sewell (2005).
Key early papers on decoherence were Zeh (1970), Zurek (1981), and Joos & Zeh
(1985), and standard reviews are Zurek (2003), Joos et al (2003), and Schlosshauer
(2007). Penetrating critiques include Janssen (2008) and Tanona (2013). See also
Camilleri (2009a) and Freire (2009) for some history.
A defence of QBism may be found in Caves, Fuchs, & Schack (2002b).
§11.3. Insolubility theorems
Insolubility theorems of the ﬁrst kind kind go back to von Neumann (1932) and,
in his wake, Wigner (1963) and Fine (1970). Theorem 11.2 is (in even more general
form) due to Busch & Shimony (1996); with slightly different assumptions, the spe-
cial case proved in the main text is due to Brown (1986). The monographs by Busch,
Lahti, & Mittelstaedt (1996) and Mittelstaedt (2004) contain detailed discussions of
theorems of this kind. See also Bacciagaluppi (2014).
The formulation of the problem of statistics and the problem of outcomes is taken
from Maudlin (1995). Theorem 11.4 is due to Bassi & Ghirardi (2003), although
here it is presented in a form inspired by Gru¨bl (2003).
For Bohmian mechanics see e.g. Goldstein (2013) and Bricmont (2016). A recent
review of the GRW program and related dynamical collapse theories is Bassi et al
(2013). Nowadays, the locus classicus for Many Worlds is Wallace (2012).
The time-evolution counterfactual discussed in the main text was inspired by the
problem of free will, see the quotation of Dennett at the beginning of §6.3.
S11.4. The Flea on Schro¨dinger’s Cat
The approach to the measurement problem discussed here has its roots in Lands-
man & Reuvers (2013) and Landsman (2013), whose model at the time only in-
volved the apparatus. This was criticized in van Heugten & Wolters (2016), many
of whose points may be addressed by turning to the Spehner–Haake model, in-
troduced by Spehner & Haake (2008). The ABN-model of Allahverdyan, Balian, &
Nieuwenhuizen (2013) gives a similar picture; for a comparison see Spehner (2009).
